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Yee v. City of Escondido--A Rejection Of

The Ninth Circuit's Unique Physical
Takings Theory Opens The Gates For
Mobile Home Park Owners' Regulatory
Takings Claims

Ownership of private property in the United States provides the
owner with rights of possession, use, and disposition.' These rights
are rooted in property principles originating from the thirteenth
century, 2 and are protected by the Takings Clause of the United
States Constitution.' The Takings Clause forbids the federal and
state governments from taking private property from the owner for
public use without providing compensation.4
Traditionally, governmental takings of private property have
been categorized as either physical or regulatory.' A physical
taking occurs when the government compels a property owner to
submit to a permanent physical occupation of the owner's property
by the government or a third person.6 A regulatory taking has
traditionally been found when government heavily regulates an

1. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,435 (1982); United States
v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945). Depending on the type of estate classification,
the owner may not own the complete rights to use, possession, or disposition of the land. RIcHARD
R. POWELL & PATRICK J. RoHAN, POWELL ON RE.AL PROPERTY §§ 172-260, at 11 (reprint 1979,

abridged ed.) (analyzing the various estates in land).
2.
PowE. & ROHM, supra note 1, § 172, at 11; see ia. § 177, at 17 (providing that, before
the end of the thirteenth century, the owner of the fee simple had an established right of free
alienation). In 1290, England recognized the right of alienation of property by enacting the Statute
Quia Emptores. Ida
3.
See U.S. CoNsT. amend. V (providing that private property will not be taken for public
use without just compensation).
4.
Id. The Takings Clause applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.L v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,241 (1897).
5.
See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
6.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982); see infra
notes 29-42 and accompanying text (discussing Loreno and physical takings).
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owner's land so as to unfairly single out the property owner to bear
a burden which should be borne by society as a whole.7 Applying
physical and regulatory taldngs law, California mobile home park
owners have recently attacked state mobile home regulations and
local rent control regulations as a violation of their constitutional
rights as protected under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.' On the state level, the California Mobilehome
Residency Law9 regulates park owners with respect to eviction of
tenants, removal of mobile homes, and disposition of leases.10 On
the local level, many cities have rent control ordinances which limit
the amount a park owner may charge a tenant for rent." Mobile
home park owners have claimed that when the state and local laws
are applied concurrently, the regulations result in a physical and/or
regulatory taking of property without just compensation. 2
In Yee v. City of Escondido, 3 the United States Supreme
Court rejected a mobile home park owner's contention that state
and local government regulations effected a physical taking.' 4
While the Court did not address the issue of whether the ordinance
had effected a regulatory taking, the Court did note that mobile
home park owners might use many of the Yees' arguments to
7. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). For example, a regulation which
banned a coal mining company from mining coal from its own property was held to be a regulatory
taking. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-16 (1922); see infra notes 43-46 and
accompanying text (discussing Pennsylvania Coal); infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text
(discussing the various regulatory takings analyses applied by the Supreme Court).
8. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 224 Cal. App. 3d 1349, 1352, 274 Cal. Rptr. 551, 553
(1990) (challenging an Escondido rent control ordinance as a physical taking of property); Hall v.
City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1273-74 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd., 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992)
(challenging a Santa Barbara rent control ordinance as a physical taking of property), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 940 (1988).
9.
See CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 789-799.7 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993); infra notes 109-22 and
accompanying text (discussing the California Mobilehome Residency Law).
10.
CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 789-799.7 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993); see infra notes 109-22 and
accompanying text (discussing the California Mobilehome Residency Law).
11. See KENNETH K. BAAR, CALIFORNIA CONTINUINo EDUCATION FOR THE BAR; CALIFORNIA
RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD TENANT PRACTICE, § 9.5, at 758 (1985 & Supp. 1992) (providing that 40
cities and several counties have adopted some form of mobile home rent regulations).
12. See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1527 (1992); Hall v. City of Santa
Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1273-74 (9th Cir. 1986) (challenging local rent control ordinances as
violations of the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution), cerr. denied, 485 U.S. 940 (1988).
13. 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992).
14. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1534.
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prove a regulatory taking. s While the Yees lost on the physical
takings claim, the Supreme Court's dicta implies that California
mobile home park owners may be able to bring a successful
regulatory takings claim on similar facts.
Part I of this Note will discuss the legal background of the
physical takings doctrine and the various tests the courts apply to
determine whether a government has effected a regulatory
taking.16 Part I will further analyze the approach taken by the
United States Supreme Court and the California appellate courts
when applying the physical and regulatory takings doctrines to rent
control and California Mobilehome Residency Law.'7 Part II will
discuss the majority and the concurring opinions of Yee v. City of
Escondido."8 Finally, Part I will present the potential legal
ramifications of Yee and analyze how the California mobile home
park owners may successfully attack rent control ordinances after
the Yee decision.19
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. The Takings Clause
The Takings Clause of the United States Constitution forbids
federal and state governments from acquiring private property for
public use without providing just compensation to the owner.2 °

15. See iULat 1528-29 (noting the relevance of the Yees' arguments to the regulatory takings
analysis); infra notes 222-284 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of the Court's
dicta).
16. See infra notes 29-90 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 91-146 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 147-216 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 217-285 and accompanying text.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Takings Clause also applies to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV; Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897). The California Constitution provides that
compensation is required when property is taken or damaged. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19 (West 1983
& Supp. 1993). California's 'damage' provision widens the scope of compensable injury. B.E.
WrIN, 8 SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, ConstitutionalLaw § 940, at 492 (9th ed. 1988); see
Rose v. California, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 719-20, 123 P.2d 505, 510 (1942) (discussing the damage
provision of the California Constitution); Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 349, 144 P.2d
818, 822-23 (1943) (providing that the government will compensate the owner for damage which the
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Takings cases separate into two distinct categories--physical takings
and regulatory takings.21 A physical taldng occurs when a
government compels a property owner to submit to a permanent
physical occupation of the owner's property by the government or
a third person.22 Additionally, government action effects a
physical taking when the government acquires title and possession
of property by condemnation.23 On the other hand, courts have
found a regulatory taking when a government regulation either
goes so far as to unfairly single out a property owner to bear a
burden which society should bear as a whole, 24 or completely

government causes that society generally does not suffer). See generally Robert Kratovil & Frank J.
Harrison Jr., Eminent Domain-Policyand the Concept of Eminent Domain, 42 CAL. L. REV. 596,
596-615 (1954) (discussing the concept of governmental takings).
21. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982)
(holding that where the government authorizes a physical occupation of property, the Takings Clause
requires compensation); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978)
(holding that where the government regulates the use of property such as to unfairly single out the
property owner to bear a burden that should be borne by the public as a whole, the Takings Clause
requires compensation).
22. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426; see infra notes 29-42 and accompanying text (discussing Loretto
and physical takings).
23. Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1526 (1992). Eminent domain is defined as
"[the power [of the government] to take private property for public use by the state, municipalities,
and private persons or corporations authorized to exercise functions of public character." BLAcK's
LAW DIcIoNARY 523 (6th ed. 1990). This power is limited by the Takings Clause of the United
States Constitution. Id.; see United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 255 (1980) (defining eminent
domain as the legal proceeding in which the government asserts its authority to condemn property);
Joseph M. Cormack, Legal Concepts in Casesof EminentDomain, 41 YALE LJ. 221,221-61 (193 1)
(discussing the use of eminent domain to acquire absolute title to property). See generally Note,
Valuation of ConrailUnder the Fifih Amendment, 90 HARv. L. REV. 596,596-615 (1977) (discussing
the government's physical taking of property for the use of railroads). Eminent domain, the power
to take private property for public use without the owner's consent, is universally accepted as an
inherent power of federal and state governments. Room A. CUNNINGHAM, ET AL., TIM LAW oF
PROPERTY, § 9.1, at 510 (Student ed. 1984).
24. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960) (analyzing whether a government
regulation substantially advances the purposes of the regulation); see also infa notes 50-74
(discussing the multi-factor balancing test for determining when the government has required too
much of a landowner or group of landowners).
The essential interests which a landowner enjoys are the rights to possess, use and dispose of
the property. United States v. General Motors, 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945); see infra notes 43-89
and accompanying text (discussing regulatory takings). Courts view regulatory takings as less serious
than physical takings, since regulatory takings usually leave the landowner with some ownership
rights still intact. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1520.

1684

1993 / Yee v. City of Escondido
diminishes the value of the owner's land.' More recently, a
regulatory taking has been found when the government's land-use
regulations do not substantially advance the purposes of the
regulations.26 Of the two types of takings recognized by the
Supreme Court, the physical taking analysis, applying the reasoning
of Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,27 is more
concrete and understandable than the regulatory takings analysis.28
1. Physical Takings--Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp.
Until 1922, a taking only occurred when the government
physically occupied or encroached upon a landowner's property.29
In addition to the physical occupation requirement, Supreme Court
cases stated or implied that physical invasions by the government

25. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138 n.36; see infra note 57 (discussing the effect a diminution
in the value of an owner's land has on the regulatory takings analysis). When state or local
governments regulate land they are normally exercising their police powers. JoHN E. NOWACK &
RONALD D. RoTuNDA, CONsantToNAL LAw, § 11.10, at 423-24 (4th ed. 1991); see id. (discussing
the government's police powers). Police power is the power of the government to regulate human
conduct to protect or promote "public health, safety, or the general welfare." Id.; see, e.g., Village
of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395-97 (1926) (declaring that a land use ordinance did
not effect a taking); Anne R. Pramaggiore, Comment, The Supreme Court's Trilogy of Regulatory
Takings: Keystone, Glendale, and Nollan, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 441, 442 (1988) (stating that
government may regulate land uses that may have a detrimental impact on society, by exercising its
police powers).
26. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,834-42 (1987); see infra notes 76-89
and accompanying text (discussing Nollan and the substantial nexus test).
27. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
28. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 432.
29. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundationsof "JustCompensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1184 (1967). A physical taking
may also occur where the governmental occupation is indirect; see infra notes 43-46 and
accompanying text (recognizing Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), as the first case
to find a regulatory taking); see, e.g., Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 166, 174-81
(1871) (holding that when a government builds a dam and, as a result, private property is flooded,
the owner of the property must be compensated). Although the Supreme Court once required a
substantial intrusion in order to find a taking, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.
recognized that this requirement had been abandoned by courts in the twentieth century. See Loreno,
458 U.S. at 430 (citing Lovett v. W. Va. Cent. Gas Co., 65 S.E. 196 (W. Va. 1909) and S.W. Bell
Tel. Co. v. Webb, 393 S.W. 2d 117, 121 (Mo. App. 1965)).
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were also subject to a balancing process3" before they could be
found compensable. 1 In 1982, Loretto v. TeleprompterManhattan
CATV Corp. abandoned the balancing approach.32 The United
States Supreme Court held that physical takings were always
compensable.33 The Loretto analysis has been widely accepted as
the modem test for finding a physical taking. 4
In Loretto, the Court addressed the issue of whether there was
a physical taking where a statute required landlords to permit cable
television companies to install cable facilities on the landlord's
property.35 The Court held that when the government authorizes
a permanent physical occupation of property, the government's
actions are a taking irrespective of the magnitude of the
interference36 or the importance of societal interests.37
The Loretto Court adopted a per se taking3" rule, because of
the extremely serious character of any physical invasion.39 A
physical occupation deprives the landlord of the essential rights of
property ownership--to possess, use, and dispose of the property.4"

30. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 432 (noting that the traditional physical takings analysis of the
Supreme Court considered such factors as the economic impact of the regulation, the extent to which
the regulation interferes with investment-backed expectations, and the character of the governmental

action).
31. Id
32. See id. at 435-38.
33. id.
34. See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1528 (1992); FCC v. Florida Power
Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 251-53 (1987); Cox Cable San Diego, Inc. v. Bookspan, 195 Cal. App. 3d 22,
26-27, 240 Cal. Rptr. 407, 409 (1987) (applying the reasoning of Loretto).
35. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 421.
36. See id. at 422 (stating that Teleprompter's occupation of property consisted of cable which
was merely one-half inch in diameter and approximately 35 feet long).
37. Id at 426.
38. The Loretto Court recognized that courts have labeled physical takings as per se takings
since these types of takings occur without regard to other factors that a court may ordinarily examine
such as the economic impact of the regulation, the extent to which the regulations interfere with
reasonable investment-backed expectations and the character of the taking. Id at 432.
39. Id at 435-36.
40. Id Physical takings are particularly serious because such a taking completely diminishes
the land of all its value. Id Teleprompter's installation involved a direct physical attachment of
plates, boxes, wires, bolts, and screws to the building completely occupying the space immediately
above and upon the roof and along the building's exterior wall. Id at 438. A complete diminution
in value occurs because the owner is deprived of all rights except the right to dispose of the occupied
space. Id at 435-36. Even the right to dispose essentially becomes valueless since prospective
purchasers would be unable to make use of the property. Id at 436.
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Even though the Court in Loretto created a per se taking rule, the

Court limited the scope of its holding. In order for a physical
taking to occur, the court must find that the government required
the invasion and that the invasion is permanent.41 Additionally,
Loretto was further limited since it noted that the physical takings
analysis would not substantially affect the government's power to
regulate landlord-tenant relationships.42 While Loretto provides a
clear test for courts to apply in physical takings cases, the analyses
to determine whether a regulatory taking has been effected is much

less clear.
2. Regulatory Takings
In Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon43 , the

Supreme

Court

recognized regulatory takings for the first time.'
The
Pennsylvania Coal Court found that when a government heavily
regulates an owner's land, the regulation may constitute a taking if

the regulation diminishes the land's value by a certain extent.45

41. Id at 426. In FederalCommunications Commission v. FloridaPower Corp., the Supreme
Court emphasized the narrow scope of Loretto. See Federal Communications Comm'n v. Florida
Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 251 (1982). The Florida Power Court stated that the statute must
specifically require the landowner to permit permanent occupation of the property in order to amount
to a physical taking. Id. Since the Act in question in Florida Power only applied after utility
companies had already allowed cable television systems to use its utility poles, the taking was not
found to be required by the statute. Id at 252.
42. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 440. Since Loretto mandates that the statute require the invasion, an
ordinance regulating landlord-tenant relationships is only a physical taking if the ordinance forces the
owner to rent the property to the tenant. kd The Court noted that no rent control ordinances had ever
been found-to effect a permanent physical taking. Id
The Loretto majority rejected the defendant's argument that the landlord could have avoided
the regulations by ceasing to rent. Id at 439 n.17. The Court ruled that allowing this as a basis for
justifying the regulation would surely lead to manipulative abuse. Id With such a windfall, the
government could enact crippling regulations and still escape having to compensate the owner. Id
43. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
44. See id. at 413. The issue before the Court in Pennsylvania Coal was whether a
governmental regulation could ever be severe enough to constitute a taking of property without
compensation. Id. The statute prohibited the mining of coal if the mining caused the subsidence of
improved property. Id at 412-13. The owners who challenged the statute had the right to mine land
on which other owners had the right to build. Id at 412.
45. Id at 415.
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The Court's only guidance was that a regulatory taking should be
found when the regulation "goes too far."46
Since Pennsylvania Coal, regulatory takings have been found
under three types of analyses. First, a regulatory taking exists when
a regulation goes so far as to unfairly single out a property owner
to bear a burden which society should bear as a whole.47 Second,
a court will find a regulatory taking when a land-use regulation
does not substantially advance legitimate state aims.48 Third, a
regulatory taking will be found when the government regulates
property to such an extent that the property ceases to possess any
economically viable use.4 9
a. The Multi-Factor Balancing Test -- Determining
Whether A Property Owner Has Been Unfairly
Singled Out To Bear A Burden Which Society
Should Bear As A Whole
A court may find a regulatory taking when a government
regulation goes so far as to unfairly single out a property owner to
bear a burden which society should bear as a whole.50
Determining when the government has imposed this unfair burden
has caused substantial confusion among the courts.51 The United
States Supreme Court has recognized that there is no set formula

46.
47.

Md
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see infra notes 50-74 and

accompanying text (discussing the multi-factor balancing test used to determine when a regulation
has unfairly singled a out a property owner).

48.

See infra notes 76-89 and accompanying text (discussing the "substantial nexus" est used

to determine whether the regulation substantially advances a legitimate state purpose).
49. See infra note 57 (discussing the standard for finding a regulatory taking as a result of

limiting a properties economically viable use). Since the significance of this branch of regulatory
takings is outside the scope of this Article, it is addressed only briefly.
50. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960).
51. See Allison Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years ofSupreme
Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. Cr. REV. 63, 63 (stating that the application of this vague
regulatory taking test has led to a "crazy quilt pattern" of rulings). Compare Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1927) (finding that a statute prohibiting the mining of coal to prevent
subsidence damage of land was a regulatory taking) with Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 506 (1987) (upholding a statute that prohibited particular types of coal
mining that would cause subsidence damage to land).
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to determine whether the government has unduly burdened the
property owner.5 2 In Pennsylvania Central Transportation
Company v. New York City,53 the Supreme Court identified five
factors which must be considered when determining whether the
government has taken property without just compensation.5 4 The
five factors which the Penn Central Court identified are: (1) The
economic impact of the regulation on the owner; (2) the extent of

interference with the owner's reasonable investment-backed
expectations; (3) the character and nature of the regulation; (4) the
extent to which the owner benefits from the regulation; and (5) the
nature and importance of the public interests which the regulation
serves. 55 The first factor which the courts must consider is the
economic impact of the regulation on the owner of the property.56
In applying this factor, courts consider the amount of money the
owner loses as a result of the regulation.5 7 The courts will also

52. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
53. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
54. See ki. at 125. In Penn Central, the issue was whether a landmark preservation law was
invalid as a taking of private property without just compensation. Id. at 107. The appellants sued New
York City, because the landmark commission had determined that the Penn Central building was a
landmark and had prohibited the appellants from building a fifty story tower above the edifice. Xd.
at 116-17. The Penn CentralCourt upheld the landmark preservation law since the law's restrictions
promoted substantial societal interests and at the same time allowed the owner reasonable beneficial
use of the property. Id. at 138.
55. Id. at 124-28, 134.
56. IdMat 124.
57. See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225-26 (1986) (discussing
the mitigation and moderation of the impact of a regulation). The Supreme Court rarely finds that
the economic impact is so great that there is a taking without regard to the other four factors. Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 138 n.36. The Penn Central Court stated that in order to obtain relief the
appellants would have to prove that the land had ceased to be economically viable as a result of the
governmental action. Iii; see Jason W. Rose, Forced TenanciesAs Takings Of Propertyin Seawall
Associates v. City of New York: Expanding on Loretto And Nollan, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 245, 261
n.156 (1990) (stating that the clear implication of footnote 36 of Penn Central was that the owner
must show a total loss of economic value to prove that a taking has occurred). Recent cases have also
held that a taking has occurred when an owner's land ceases to be economically viable. See First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 309 (1987); Agins
v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980). But see Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct.
2886, 2893 (1992) (providing instead that the issue for determining whether there has been a
regulatory taking because of diminution in value is whether the property still has beneficial and
productive use).
The Penn CentralCourt also established that when considering the value of the property after
it is regulated, courts should consider the parcel as a whole. Penn Centra at 130. The Court
expressly rejected the appellant's argument that when evaluating a taking, a court should divide a
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consider any provisions within the regulation which moderate and
mitigate the individual landowner's loss.58 The second factor
is the extent to which the regulation interferes with the landowner's
reasonable investment-backed expectations.59 To find the property
owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations, courts measure
the pervasiveness of regulations in a particular field. 60 For
example, if the owner invests in an area where property is already
heavily regulated, the owner will reasonably expect to use the land
subject to those regulations. 6' The courts will also consider the
investor's expectations lower if the owner should have known at
the time the owner invested capital that the property .may be
subject to future regulations.62
The third factor to consider is the character or nature of the
taking. 63 In determining the character of the regulation, the Penn
Central Court drew a distinction between physical invasions 6" and
regulations.65 The Court in Penn Central recognized that it would
more likely find a taking where there was a physical invasion of
the owner's land, as opposed to when the government merely
sought to adjust the benefits and burdens of economic life to

single parcel into different interests, such as the airspace above the building, and then determine
whether the worth of that particular interest has been completely abrogated. Id.
58. Penn Centra4 438 U.S. at 137 (providing that the Landmark Preservation Act granted
rights to build above other parcels to the owners); Connolly v. United States, 475 U.S. 211, 225-26
(1986) (discussing the mitigation and moderation of the impact of a regulation).
59. Penn Centra 438 U.S. at 124-25. Although the Penn CentralCourt did not specifically
make a distinction between the economic impact and the effect on investment backed expectations,
the Court has adopted the two as distinct factors. See id. at 124 (stating that the courts must look at
the economic impact "and, particularly" the extent to which the regulation interferes with the owner's
reasonable investment-backed expectations); Connolly v. Pension Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211,225-27
(1986) (analyzing economic impact and affect on investment backed expectations as two distinct
categories).
60. See Connolly, 475 U.S. at 227 (holding that the plaintiff employers had more than
sufficient notice to know that pension plans were closely regulated and would likely be subject to
more regulations in the future).
61. R.S. Radford, Regulatory Takings Law in the 1990's: The Death of Rent Control?,21 S.U.
L. REV. 1019, 1069 (1992).
62. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 227.
63. Penn Centra 438 U.S. at 124.
64. See supra notes 29-42 and accompanying text (discussing physical takings).
65. Penn Central,438 U.S. at 124; see Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225 (discussing the distinction
between physical and regulatory takings).
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promote the common good.6 The Supreme Court has expanded
the analysis of the character of the regulation to include
determining the extent to which a regulation restricts a recognized
property right, such as the right to exclude other people from the
owner's property.6 7
The fourth factor to consider when determining whether a
regulatory taking has been effected is the "average reciprocity of
advantage., 68 Under this theory, regulations that diminish the
value of property by limiting its use may be justified, or at least
partially offset, by an increase in the value of the complaining
landowner's property as a result of similar restrictions on
neighboring properties. 69 For example, the government may design
zoning ordinances, which may limit the use of an owner's land, to
maintain the general character of the area or to assure orderly
development.7"
The fifth factor for determining whether a regulatory taking
exists is the nature and importance of the public interests which the
regulation serves. 71' A regulation is more likely to be upheld if the
regulation promotes the health, safety, morals and general welfare

66. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225.
67. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704,716 (1987) iciting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
68. Penn Central,438 U.S. at 140 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For an excellent discussion of
the history and application of the average reciprocity of advantage theory, see generally Raymond
R. Coletta, Reciprocity of Advantage and Regulatory Takings: Toward A New Theory of Takings
Jurisprudence,40 AM. U. L. REV. 297 (1990).
69. Penn Central 438 U.S. at 139-40 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)). Although the Court did not explicitly recognize "average
reciprocity of advantage," as a factor, the majority did implicitly recognize its importance by
analyzing Penn Central'sclaim that they were not benefitted by the Landmark Preservation Act. Id.
at 134.
70. Id at 139 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The majority found that the Legislature
determined that New York citizens would benefit both economically and by improving the quality
of life in the city as a whole. Xa. at 134. The Penn Central majority held that this was a significant
reciprocal benefit of the Landmark Preservation Act. Id The Court also noted that the owner
benefitted because the "air rights" were transferable to other buildings in the city which the owner
possessed. Id at 135. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704,715 (1987) (analyzing "average reciprocity"
to determine whether there was a regulatory taking).
71. Penn Central,438 U.S. at 124.
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of the public. 72 For example, the Court has upheld a law
prohibiting a landowner from operating a brickyard because the
legislature had reasonably concluded that the presence of the
brickyard was inconsistent with neighboring uses, because of the
fumes, gases and smoke the brickyard produced.73
Courts must weigh and balance each of these five factors on
a case-by-case basis to determine whether a regulation unfairly
burdens a landowner.74 If the Court does not find a regulatory
taking under this multi-factor balancing test, it may nevertheless
find a regulatory taking under the test presented in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission.75
b. Determining Whether A Regulation Substantially
Advances Legitimate State Aims -- Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission
A court may also find a regulatory taking where a land-use
76
regulation does not substantially advance legitimate state aims.
The Supreme Court first established this rule in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission.77 The Nollan Court addressed the
issue of whether there was a regulatory taking where a condition
attached to a building permit for a coastal residence required the
78
owner to grant an easement along the beach to the public.

72. Id at 125. In Penn Central,the societal interest factor outweighed all others. Id. at 138.
The Court found that the regulation, which placed restrictions on the development of individual
historical landmarks, was a reasonable means of promoting important general welfare interests in
environmental control and historic preservation. Id
73. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394,408,414 (1915). The Penn CentralCourt cited
Nectow v. Cambridgeas an example of a public interest defeating a regulatory taking claim. Penn
Central,438 U.S. at 125 (citing Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928)). In Nectow, the
Court upheld a regulation even though it adversely affected a property interest. Nectow, 277 U.S. at
188. The regulation in Nectow promoted the health, safety, morals and general welfare, and was thus
within the police powers of the state. Id
74. See Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (providing that a court must
analyze each case on its particular facts); Penn Central,438 U.S. at 124 (providing that the Court
will engage in an ad hoe factual inquiry).
75. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
76. Id. at 834.
77.

Id.

78.

Id, at 828.
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Nollan held that the conditional permit amounted to a regulatory
taking, because it did not substantially advance the aims of the
regulation.79 The Court developed a two part test to determine
whether a regulation results in a regulatory taking. 80 First, there
must be a legitimate state interest in enacting the regulation.81
Second, the regulation must substantially serve the same
governmental interest which the government purported to
accomplish by enacting the statute.82 If the court finds the

79. See id. at 838-39. Although the majority's argument initially mirrored a physical takings
analysis, as illustrated by its reference to the conditional easement as a permanent physical
occupation, the Nollan Court did not use the categorical physical takings rule to find a taking. See
id. at 837; Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understandingof the Taking Clause is Neither Weak
Nor Obtuse, 88 COLum. L. REv. 1630, 1650-51 (1988) (providing that the Nollan Court did not use
the physical invasion argument to ultimately find the conditional easement invalid); R.S. Radford,
supra note 61, at 1024 n.38 (stating that the facts and language of the Nollan opinion clearly
distinguish Nollan from physical takings cases); Kari Anne Gallager, Comment, Yee v. City of
Escondido: Will Mobile Homes Provide an Open Roadfor the Nollan Analysis? 67 NoTRE DAME
L. REV. 821, 841 (1992) (providing that the origin of the "substantially advancing a state interest"
requirement in non-physical takings cases proves that Nollan was not a physical takings analysis).
But see Frank I. Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1608-09 (1988) (stating that
the "rational nexus" test only applies to government actions deemed physical takings); Neal Stout,
Comment, 38 WASH. U. J. URB. & CoNTRM. L. 305, 311-15 (1990) (opining that Justice Scalia
applied the physical invasion test in Nollan).
80. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37.
81. See id.
82. See id. In Nollan, the Nollan Court applied what has traditionally been called either "midlevel," "intermediate," or "heightened" scrutiny. See Kmiec, supra note 79, at 1650-51 (noting that
the Nollan Court applied heightened intermediate scrutiny); Michelman, supra note 79, at 1608
(writing that Nollan expressly endorsed a form of semi-strict or heightened judicial scrutiny); Rose,
supranote 57, at 250-51 (observing that Nollan applied a heightened scrutiny standard). The Supreme
Court has applied this intermediate level of review in other cases involving interests which the Court
thought to be substantially important, but not constitutionally "fundamental." LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMMUCAN CONSMrUrrONAL LAW, § 16-33, at 1610 (2d ed. 1984). Normally, courts give great
deference to economic regulations by applying rational basis, low-level scrutiny. Xd. § 8-7, at 581-86
(2d ed. 1984); see United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938) (declaring that the

Court would uphold a regulation in the socioeconomic sphere if any facts known or reasonably
inferable afforded support for the legislative judgment); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483,
487 (1955) (using hypothetical facts and reasons to justify legislation); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726, 731-32 (1963) (upholding legislation without any apparent substantive reasons).
Cases involving gender discrimination, discrimination against aliens, discrimination against
illegitimate children, and restrictions on commercial speech have all demanded the use of the
intermediate level of review. See, e.g., Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982) (holding that a
law which discriminates against illegitimate children will only survive when they are substantially
related to a legitimate state interest); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730-33
(1982) (invalidating a statute which excluded males from enrolling in a state supported professional
nursing school, because the state failed to show that the classification substantially and directly
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regulation had no legitimate purpose, or that it did not substantially
serve the regulation's intended purpose, a taking will be found.83
In Nollan, the state claimed that the purpose of the restriction
was to prevent beach front housing congestion, and to protect the
public's ability to see the beach.84 The state attempted to advance
these interests by requiring that the petitioner grant an easement
along the beach to the public.85 Since the easement did not protect
the public's ability to see the beach86 or prevent beach front
housing congestion, 7 the easement did not substantially advance
either of the state's purported purposes. 8 Thus, the Court held
that a taking occurred.89
Courts apply Nollan and Penn Central to determine whether a
regulation of property effects a regulatory taking. Therefore, a rent
control ordinance must pass both the Nollan and the Penn Central
tests to be held constitutional. The Supreme Court has decided very
few cases which analyze the constitutionality of rent control under
the Takings Clause. However, the Court has recently given its
general approval to the constitutionality of rent control in Pennell
v. City of San Jose.'°

related to its proposed objective); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Servs Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 564 (1980) (holding that restrictions on commercial speech must directly advance the state
interest and may not be sustained if the restrictions provide only an ineffective or remote support for
the government's purpose); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976) (holding that, since
illegitimacy is beyond the individual's control and bears no relation to the individual's ability to
participate in and contribute to society, discrimination must be subject to a intermediate level of
review); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (invalidating a statute which set the allowable
drinking age for 3.2% beer at 18 for women but 21 for men because it did not substantially relate
to the achievement of the statute's purported purposes); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 772-73
(1977) (finding that the Illinois Probate Act which restricted illegitimate children from inheriting from
their fathers was invalid because the restrictions were too attenuated from the purposes of the Act).
83. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
84. Id. at 835.
85. Ic. at 828.
86. See id. at 838 (reasoning that a requirement that people already on the beaches be allowed
to walk across the Nollan's property could not possibly reduce any obstacles to viewing the beach
created by the new house).
87. See i. at 838-39 (noting that it is impossible to understand how the easement helps to
remedy any additional congestion).
88. Id. at 839.
89. Id at 841-42.
90. 485 U.S. 1(1988); see infra notes 101-06 and accompanying text (discussing the Pennell
case).
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B. ConstitutionalReview of Rent Control
Rent control is a regulatory device which enables state and
local governments to keep a landlord's rent below the fair market
rental value of the property.9 ' The Supreme Court first upheld the
constitutionality of rent control during World War I in Block v.
Hirsh. 2 In Block, the Court concluded that the rent control statute
was constitutional, because of the government's important purpose
of providing a temporary emergency measure to counteract a severe
shortage in housing during the war.9"
When the Supreme Court held rent control constitutional in
Block, the regulatory takings doctrine did, not yet exist.94
Therefore, the Block Court did not analyze the statute under the
Takings Clause. 95 Three years after the Court decided Block, the

91. Richard A. Epstein, Rent Controland the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L.
REV. 741, 746 (1988).
92. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 154 (1921) (providing that Congress sought to improve an
impacted rental market in Washington, D.C. caused by an influx of people during World War 1); see
Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 518-19 (1944) (upholding a rent control ordinance as an
emergency measure during World War II); BAAR, supra note 11, § 9.3, at 757 (discussing the
Supreme Court's review of emergency rent control statutes). In addition to upholding the rent control
ordinance as an emergency measure, the Block Court applied a substantive due process analysis.
Block, 256 U.S. at 157-58. The Block Court reasoned that preventing landlords from taking advantage
of the emergency shortage by charging inflated rents was a legitimate end. Id. The Block Court then
concluded that rent control was a means reasonably related to the end of preventing such profiteering.
Id at 158. The Block Court also held that landlords were entitled to a reasonable rent. IL at 157; see
Bowles, 321 U.S. at 517-18 (upholding an ordinance because it allowed landlords to make a just and
reasonable return).
93. Block, 256 U.S. at 154.
94. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text (providing that in 1922, PennsylvaniaCoal
became the first case to apply a regulatory takings analysis).
95. There are three types of non-takings challenges to rent control. Marc J. Korpus, Comment,
Rent Controland Landlords'ProperyRights: The ReasonableReturn DoctrineRevived, 33 RUTGERS
L. REV. 165, 175 (1980). First, rent control is a violation of the Due Process Clause, which provides
that a person will not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S.
CONST. amends. V & XIV. In order to withstand a due process claim, a rent control regulation must
enable the owner to receive a just and reasonable return on rented property. Block, 256 U.S. at 157;
see also Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 13 (1988) (providing that a provision would be
invalid under the Due Process Clause if it allowed the landlord a reasonable return on investment);
Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d 644, 679-80, 693 P.2d 261,289-90, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682, 710711 (1984) (upholding regulations which contained a fair return on investment standard); Parks v.
Rent Control Bd. of Township Hazlet, 526 A.2d 685,686-87 (NJ. 1987) (upholding requirement with
a just and reasonable return standard); cf. Baker v. City of Santa Monica, 181 Cal. App. 3d 972, 97879, 980, 226 Cal. Rptr. 755, 759 (1986) (providing that the trial court used a standard which took
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Supreme Court, in Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair,96 held that the
same rent control statute upheld in Block could effect a regulatory
taldng.97 The Court ruled that the rent control regulation was no
longer consistent with the Fifth Amendment since there was no
presence of an emergency. 98 With the exception of the Court's
approval of rent control as an emergency measure during World
War Il,9 the Supreme Court did not review the constitutionality
of rent control until 1988. t0

the property's fair market value at the time the government dedicated the property to public use);
Jonathan M. Ross, Comment, CaliforniaRent Controlas Applied: AssesSed Value as a Measure of
FairReturn, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 715, 728-30 (1987) (suggesting that courts should adopt an
.assessed value standard," which analyzes whether an owner has received a "fair return" from
controlled rent according to the assessed value of the building). The second non-takings constitutional challenge to rent control has been made under the equal protection clause. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4 (providing that "[n]o [s]tate shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the law"). The Supreme Court has rejected these arguments
holding that rent control laws treating classes of buildings, tenants, and land unequally were not
unconstitutional under the equal protection clause. Korpus, supra at 175; see Bowles v. Willingham,
321 U.S. 503, 516-19 (1944) (rejecting the argument that fixing rents by class or type of apartment
is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, because rent-fixing would place too great a
burden on government); Bucho Holding Co. v. Temporary State Hous. Rent Comm., 184 N.E.2d 569,
573-74 (N.Y. App. Ct. 1962) (rejecting the argument that treating landlords differently because of
their locality is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause); 8200 Realty Corp. v. Lindsay, 261 N.E.2d
647, 653-55 (N.Y. App. Ct. 1970) (upholding a regulation challenged under the Equal Protection
Clause which treated housing units differently depending on their date of construction). The courts
which have rejected the equal protection claim have indicated that a statute will not be invalidated
under the Equal Protection Clause unless the classification involves a suspect group, infringes on
fundamental rights, or is arbitrary and unreasonable. Korpus, supra at 176.
The third challenge to rent control has come under the Contracts Clause. See U.S. CONsr. art.
1, § 10 (providing that "[n]o State shall ... pass any . . . [1]aw impairing the [o]bligation of
[c]ontracts. .. ."). No such challenge has been successful. Korpus, supra at 176; see Marcus Brown
Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170, 198 (1921) (providing that a regulation, as applied in favor
of tenants holding over under an expired lease in disregard of their covenant to surrender, did not
violate the Contracts Clause); Kargman v. Sullivan, 582 F.2d 131, 134 (1st Cir. 1978) (providing that
the fact that owners subsidized under the National Housing Act (FHA) received significantly less than
FHA approved rents as a consequence of rent control was not a violation of the Contracts Clause).
96. 264 U.S. 543 (1924).
97. Id. at 546-49.
98. Id; see Radford, supra note 61, at 1029 (providing that Chastleton underscored the
significance of the existence of exigent circumstances and the absence of regulatory takings when
the Court decided Block).
99. See Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 516-19 (1944) (holding that rent control was
constitutional in light of the emergency of World War 1I).
100. BAAR, supra note 11, § 9.3, at 757 (providing that New York was the only state to
continue rent controls after World War II until the 1970's). Id § 9.4, at 757-58 (providing that
Washington, D.C., Miami, Boston, and cities in New Jersey and California all had rent control
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In Pennell v. City of San Jose, 0 ' the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether a rent control ordinance had
effected a regulatory taking where it allowed a city-appointed
employee to consider the financial hardship of the tenant, in
addition to six other factors, to decide whether a landlord could
raise the rent."° The Court ruled that, since the city had never
applied the financial hardship provision to a particular tenant, the
Court could not declare that the regulation amounted to a
regulatory taking. ' 3 However, the Court recognized the general
validity of rent control, despite the absence of an emergency
justification, by ruling that the regulation was not a violation of due
process." 4 The Court noted that the express purpose of the rent
control ordinance was to prevent excessive and unreasonable rent
increases due to housing shortages.'0 5 The Court held that this
purpose was sufficient to withstand the landowner's due process

regulations during the mid 1970's). Although the Court emphasized the emergency requirement in
Block and Chastleton, several state courts disregarded this requirement. See, e.g., Birkenfield v. City
of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 156-57, 550 P.2d 1001, 10221, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465, 485 (1976) (noting
that recent court opinions upholding rent control had not referred to the emergency requirement);
Westchester West No. 2 Ltd. Partnership v. Montgomery County, 348 A.2d 856, 865 (MD. 1975)
(concluding that an emergency shortage of housing was no longer needed to uphold rent control);
Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council of the Town West Orange, 350 A.2d 1, 12 (1975) (ignoring
the emergency requirement when formulating the scope of review for rent control).
101. 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
102. Id. at 4. The ordinance provided that, in order for a landlord to obtain an increase in rent,
the landlord must first obtain permission from a mediation hearing officer. Id at 5. In deciding
whether the landlord could raise the rent, the hearing officer must consider seven factors. Id at 9.
The first six factors assist the officer determine whether a raise the rent is objectively reasonable. Id
The seventh factor provides that the homeowner should consider the financial hardship to the
particular tenant or tenants. Id. The plaintiffs argued that since the first six factors are designed to
determine what is reasonable, the seventh factor would reduce the rent to below that reasonable
amount. Id The plaintiffs claimed that this additional reduction represented a regulatory taking since
it unjustly forces the landlord to subsidize the poor tenants. Id
103. Id at 9-15; see Epstein, supra note 91, at 752 (calling the Pennell decision a -judicial
non-event" because the Court never reached the regulatory takings claim).
104. See Pennell, 485 U.S. at 13-14 (providing that the San Jose rent control regulations were
a rational attempt to protect the tenants while guaranteeing a fair return to the landlord, and therefore,
withstood the Due Process Clause challenge).
105. hid at 12-13.
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attack, as long as the regulation guaranteed a fair return to the
landlord." 6
Since Pennell, the Supreme Court has not granted certiorari for
review of any rent control ordinances. Nevertheless, state courts
have recently considered the issue of whether particular rent control
ordinances effect takings, and have generally upheld rent control
ordinances as constitutional when the ordinance provides a
reasonable rate of return to the landlord as required by Pennell.07
However, an exception to this general agreement exists due to a
direct conflict between the California Court of Appeal and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals as to the constitutionality of rent
control within mobile home parks. 0 8 Since state law also closely
regulates the mobile home park owners' property, the courts also
considered the effect of California Mobilehome Residency Law on
the takings challenges.

106. Id at 13-14. In his dissent, Justice Scalia stated that he would find that this statute
amounted to a taking since the law clearly forced some people to bear public burdens which should
be borne by the public. Id at 15, 21, 23 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107. See, e.g., Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d 644, 679-82, 693 P.2d 261, 289-91, 209
Cal. Rptr. 682, 710-12 (1984) (holding that a city rent control ordinance which paid a fair return on
investment was constitutional); Benson Realty Corp. v. Beame, 409 N.E.2d 948, 949 (N.Y. 1980)
(providing that rent control is presumptively constitutional); Spring Realty Co. v. NY City Loft Bd.,
487 N.Y.S.2d 973, 977 (N.Y. 1985) (upholding a rent control law since the means adopted were
reasonable under the circumstances); Apartment & Office Bldg. Ass'n of Metro Washington v.
Washington, 381 A.2d 588, 590 (D.C. 1977) (upholding rent control on its face due to a housing

crisis).
108. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 224 Cal. App. 3d 1349, 1351, 274 Cal. Rptr. 551, 552
(1990) (holding that a rent control ordinance combined with state laws did not effect a physical
taking), aft'd, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992); cf Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1276 (9th
Cir. 1986) (holding that a rent control ordinance combined with state laws effected a physical taking),
cert. denied 485 U.S. 940 (1988).
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C. The California Mobilehome Residency Law

In most mobile home parks, the mobile home owners rent the
pads"° on which the mobile home sits, while the tenants own the

mobile home itself."' In addition to supplying the pads, the
mobile home park owners often accommodate their tenants with
roads, a swimming pool, lakes, and a clubhouse."' In 1978, the
California Legislature enacted the California Mobilehome
Residency Law" 2 which limits the circumstances in which the
mobile home park owners could evict mobile home owners in order
to provide mobile home owners with protection from the high cost
of moving."' The California Mobilehome Residency Law also
limits the circumstances in which the mobile home park owner can
remove the tenant's mobile home." 4 The Legislature found the
protection against eviction necessary for two reasons. First, eviction
forces the tenant to pay the high cost of moving the mobile home,
and to risk damaging the mobile home during the move." 5
Second, eviction forces the tenant to pay the high cost of preparing
another lot for installation of the mobile home." 6
The California Mobilehome Residency Law protects the mobile
home owner from eviction and the forced removal of the mobile
home in three ways. First, the California Mobilehome Residency

109. See Werner Z. Hirsch & Joel G. Hirsch, Legal-EconomicAnalysis of Rent Controls in a
Mobile Home Context: Placement Values and Vacancy Decontrol,35 UCLA L. REv. 399,405 (1988)
(defiming pad as the land which is rented for placement of the mobile home).
110. See Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 109, at 405 (providing that in !987, 95% of all mobile
homes were owned by the tenants).
11. Kirkpatrick v. City of Oceanside, 232 Cal. App. 3d 267, 271, 283 Cal. Rptr. 191, 193
(1991); see Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 109, at 405-06 (providing that in most parks, the operator
will provide amenities such as roads, access to water and electricity, pools, and lakes).
112. See CAt. Ctv. CODE §§ 789-799.7 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993).
113. See id. §§ 789-799.7 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993); see Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 109,
at 420 (opining that the California Mobile Home Residency Law was one of the causes of an erosion
of mobile home park landlords' property rights).
114. CAL. CirV. CODE §§ 789-799.7 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993); see Hirsch & Hirsch, supra
note 109, at 420 (opining that California Mobile Home Residency Law was one of the causes of an
erosion of mobile home park landlords' property rights).
115. CAL. CIv. CODE § 798.55(a) (West Supp. 1993); see Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 109,
at 404-05 (discussing the difficulty involved when moving a mobile home).
116. CAI- CIV. CODE § 798.55(a) (West Supp. 1993); see Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 109,
at 404-05 (providing that relocation will cost between $200 to $3,000).
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Law limits the circumstances in which a park owner may evict a
tenant." 7 The park owner may only evict when: (1) The tenant
does not comply with a local or state law or regulation relating to
the mobile homes; (2) the tenant engages in substantially annoying
conduct which affects other residents; (3) the tenant is convicted
for prostitution or possession of controlled substances while on the
park premises; (4) the tenant violates a reasonable park rule after
being given a warning; (5) the tenant does not pay rent; (6) the city
condemns the mobile home park; or (7) the park owner wishes to
change the use of his land.11 Second, California Mobilehome
Residency Law protects mobile home purchasers by prohibiting the
park owners from requiring the seller to remove the mobile home
when the mobile home is sold by the current renter of the pad. 119
Finally, under the California Mobilehome Residency Law,
whenever a purchaser of a mobile home has the means to pay
rent,
120
tenant.
new
a
as
purchaser
the
accept
must
the park owner
Thus, California limits the park owner's ability to evict tenants
12 1
and to force tenants to remove their mobile homes.
Furthermore, cities may also limit the power of the park owner to
raise the rental price for mobile home pads. The combined burden
which local rent control ordinances and the state law places on the
park owners has lead to claims by the park owners that the
regulations have effected unconstitutional takings. The California
Court of Appeal and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals were in
direct conflict as to whether the combined effect of the state law
and city ordinances could result in a physical taking. The Ninth
122
Circuit Court of Appeals, in Hall v. City of Santa Barbara,
was the first to address this issue.

117. CAL. CIV. CODE § 798.56(a)-(h) (West Supp. 1993).
118.
Ld.§§ 789-799.7 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993).
119. CAL CIv. CODE § 798.73 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993).
120. Id. § 798.74 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993). The California Mobilehome Residency Law does
not provide for any controls on rent. Ua.§§ 789-799.7 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993).
121. Id. §§ 798.55-798.61 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993).
122. 833 F.2d. 1270 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 940 (1988).
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1.

Hall v. City of Santa Barbara

In Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed the issue of whether a physical taking was
effected where a mobile home park ordinance effectively granted
low rent leases in perpetuity." z The appellate court held that
requiring a lease to perpetually continue at a low market price
could effect a permanent transfer of a possessory interest in land
to the initial tenant, and this transfer of interest could amount to a

physical taking. 24 The court defined this possessory interest as
the right to occupy land in perpetuity at a rate substantially lower
than its market value. 1" Since the California Residency Law
requires the landowner to accept new tenants if they have the

ability to pay rent, the original tenants can sell the right to occupy
in perpetuity to subsequent tenants. 126 The Hall court found that
the high sale price of the tenants' mobile home to subsequent
tenants reflected the transfer of the right to occupy at sub-market
rates."27

123. I. at 1273-74; see BLACK's LAw DIcTIONARY 1141 (6th ed. 1990) (defining perpetuity
as continuing forever); In Re Estate of Steele, 124 Cal. 533, 537, 57 P. 564, 565 (1899) (defining
perpetuity as any limitation which may take away or suspend the absolute power of alienation for
a period beyond the continuance of fives being). The Santa Barbara Ordinance limited the park
owners' property rights in three ways. HaIl, 833 F.2d at 1273. First, the ordinance required leases
of unlimited duration. Id.Second, tenants could terminate their leases at will while park operators
could only terminate when: (1) The tenant failed to comply with local or state mobile home
regulations; (2) the tenant engaged in conduct which constituted a substantial annoyance to other
residents; (3) the tenant failed to comply with lease provisions or reasonable park rules; (4) the tenant
failed to pay rent or other charges; (5) the park was condemned; or (6) the owner changed the use
of the park. I. at 1273 n.2. Third, the ordinance strictly limited the amount of rent which the
operator could charge. Il at 1273; see id at 1273 n.3 (stating that a park owner may increase rent
once a year by 3% and may raise the rent by up to 10% when a space becomes vacant); cf CAL. Crv.
CODE §§ 789-799.7 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993) (providing similar limitations on mobile home park
owners with the exception of strict limits on rent increases).
124. Hall, 833 F.2d at 1276.
125. Id.The court rejected the city's argument that the landlord's ability to remove for cause
lessened the impact of the statute on the landlord to such an extent as to defeat the physical takings
claim. IL at 1277. The court noted that this factor lessened the economic impact somewhat, but it
was not enough to change the fact that a possessory interest is transferred to the initial tenant as a
long as the subsequent tenants pay the rent and act respectfully. Il
126. Id at 1279.
127. Id.
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The Hall court noted that the policy behind the per se physical
taking found in Loretto v. Manhattan Teleprompter CA TV
Corp.128 strongly supported the recognition of the right to
perpetually occupy land at a sub-market price." 9 The Ninth
Circuit court noted that, like the statute in Loretto, the ordinance
in Hall deprived the owner of the rights to use, possess, and
dispose of a property interest without providing compensation. 3 '
The impact of the holding in Hall on California law was
substantially weakened when it was expressly rejected by the
California Court of Appeal of the Fourth Appellate District in Yee
v. City of Escondido."'
2. Yee v. City of Escondido -- An Explicit Rejection of
Hall
In Yee v. City of Escondido, the California Court of Appeal of
the Fourth Appellate District addressed the issue of whether a rent
control ordinance, together with the California Mobilehome
Residency Law, could effect a physical taking.132 Rejecting the
holding of Hall, the Yee court found that such an ordinance could
not affect a physical taking for two reasons.'33 First, the Yee
court stated that the Hall opinion misapplied the reasoning of
Loretto.14 Loretto explicitly stated that the physical taking

analysis would not effect the landlord-tenant relationship unless the
regulations required the landlord to submit to a physical occupation

128. 458 U.S. 419 (1982); see supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text (providing that the
Loretto Court based its decision on the policy protecting the essential rights of the landowner to
possess, use, and dispose of private property).
129. Hall, 833 F.2d at 1277.
130. l The deprivation of these rights, as the Loretto Court noted, is an invasion of an
unusually serious character. Id; see supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text (discussing Loretto).
131. 224 Cal. App. 3d 1349, 274 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1990), aft'd, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992),
132. Id at 1352,274 Cal. Rptr. 551,552. The plaintiffs in Yee modeled their claim to conform
to the reasoning of the Hall opinion. Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1527 (1992).
133. Yee, 224 Cal. App. at 1357-58, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 556-57.
134. Id at 1358, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 557.
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of the property by a third party.1 35 Second, the Yee court found
the fact that the tenant could sell the tenant's mobile home at an
inflated rate irrelevant to the physical taking question. 36 The
inflated price is irrelevant because the rent control ordinance's
effect on the mobile home park owner is the same as any other rent
control ordinance, despite the windfall given to the initial
tenant. 137
Having found the physical taking analysis inapplicable,1 38 the
court addressed the regulatory taking claim.1 39 Prior cases
established that, as long as the rent control ordinance provides a
just and reasonable return on the property,14 a court will not find
a regulatory taking.14 ' However, the court in Yee did not decide
whether there was a just and reasonable return on the mobile home
owner's property.' 42 Since the park owners never attempted to
raise the rents, the park owners could not claim that the ordinance
deprived them of a just and reasonable return on their
investment. 4 3 After the California Supreme Court refused to
review Yee," 4 the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the California Court of Appeal and similarly did not
reach the regulatory takings claim. 45 However, the Supreme

135. Id. at 1357, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 556. The court noted that Loretto expressly stated that its
holding did not affect laws which governed the landlord tenant relationship. Id. at 1355, 274 Cal.
Rptr. at 554-55; see supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning of the
Loretto Court).
136. Yee, 224 Cal. App. at 1356, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
137. Id. The ordinance deprives the park owner of the same amount of value whether the
original tenant or all the subsequent tenants receive the benefit of the rent control ordinance. Id. The

court noted that the identity of the person who received the profit had never been of any
constitutional significance. Xa
138. IM at 1353, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
139. 1&
140. Id; see supra notes 91-108 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional analysis

of rent control).
141. Yee, 224 Cal. App. 3d at 1353, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
142. IM
143. Id at 1354, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
144. Yee v. City of Escondido, No. S018658, Cal. LEXIS 353, at *1 (Cal. Jan. 21, 1991).
145. Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1532 (1992); see infra notes 168-211 and
accompanying text (discussing the majority opinion in Yee).
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Court provided strong dicta regarding the significance that similar
rent regulations would have in a regulatory takings analysis. 46
II. THE CASE
In Yee v. City of Escondido,47 the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict between the Fourth
District Court of Appeal of California'48 and the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals of the United States.14 9 The Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether a local rent control ordinance could
affect a physical taking when applied concurrently with a state law
regulating mobile home rental, 5 ' where the rent control
ordinance limits the amount of rent a mobile home park owner can
charge a tenant15 1 and the state law limits the park owner's
ability to evict, select new tenants, and remove mobile homes. 5 '
A. The Facts
John and Irene Yee own a mobile home park in Escondido,
California. 53 Since 1978, California mobile home parks have
been subject to the California Mobilehome Residency Law. 54 In
1988, the City of Escondido passed a rent control ordinance which
prohibits park owners from charging more rent for pads than park

146. See Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1529-30 (noting in several places that the Yees" arguments are
relevant to the regulatory takings).
147. 112 S.Ct. 1522.
148. See supra notes 131-143 and accompanying text (discussing the analysis and holding of
the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District in Yee v. City of Escondido).
149. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1527; see supra notes 123-130 and accompanying text (discussing the
reasoning and holding of the Ninth Circuit in Hall v. City ofSanta Barbara).The Court further stated

that they granted review because of the size of California, its abundance of mobile homes, and the
fear that this conflict would lead to forum shopping. See Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1534.
150. See Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1526-27; supra notes 131-143 and accompanying text (providing
an analysis of the California Court of Appeal reasoning in Yee).
151. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1526-27.
152. Id.
153. Id at 1527.
154. Id at 1526; see supra notes 109-121 and accompanying text (discussing the California
Mobilehome Residency Law).
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owners charged in 1986.155 Under the Escondido ordinance, a
park owner may not increase rent for a pad unless the City Council
approves the increase. 156 The Yees filed suit in California state
court claiming that, as a result of the rent control ordinance and the
Mobilehome Residency Law, the Yees' property had been
unconstitutionally taken without just compensation." 7 The Yees
argued that there were five factors which warranted a finding of a
physical taking. First, relying on Hall,the Yees contended that the
government transferred a distinct possessory interest in land--the
right to occupy property in perpetuity--from the park owners to the
tenants while only paying a fraction of its value. 151 Second, the
Yees argued that the ordinance transfers wealth from park owners
to the original tenants, as evidenced by the high cost at which the
tenants can subsequently sell the mobile homes. 159 Third, the
Yees argued that the ordinance only benefits the first tenant,
because the subsequent tenants' low rent is offset by the high cost
of the mobile home they purchase from the initial tenant."
Fourth, the Yees argued that the ordinance deprives petitioners of
the ability to choose their incoming tenants, since the Yees may not
threaten to increase rent for the prospective purchasers that the
Yees disfavor. 61 Fifth, the Yees contended that the Loretto Court
ruled that the government could not justify a physical invasion on

155. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1527.
156. Id. The Council must approve any increases it determines to be just, fair and reasonable,
after considering the following factors: (1) Changes in the Consumer Price Index; (2) the rent charged

for comparable mobile home pads in Escondido; (3) the length of time since the last rent increase;
(4) the cost of any capital improvements related to the pad or pads at issue; (5) changes in property
taxes; (6) changes in any rent paid by the park owner for the land; (7) changes in utility charges; (8)
changes in operating and maintenance expenses; (9) the need for repairs other than for ordinary wear

and tear;, (10) the amount and quality of services provided to the affected tenant; and (11) any lawful
existing lease. Escommo, CAL, ORDINANCE § 4(g), App. 11-12 (1988). These eleven factors are
non-exclusive. Id
157. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1527.
158. Id
159. Id at 1529-30.

160.

Id

161.

Id at 1530 n.1.
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the grounds that a landlord has the option to stop renting to
tenants.162 In addition to the Yees' five arguments for a physical
taking, the Yees asserted that the ordinance constitutes a regulatory
taking under both Penn Central and Nollan.'63
The Superior Court sustained the City's demurrer despite the
Yees' argument that the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Hall v. City of
Santa Barbaradictated that the Escondido ordinance constituted a
physical taking.6 The Court of Appeal also rejected Hall, stating
that the Hall court had misapplied the reasoning of Loretto's
physical takings analysis 65 The California Supreme Court denied
review.1m The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve the conflict between the decisions of the federal and state
7
16

CoUrtS.

B. The Majority Opinion
In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Court held that the
Escondido rent control ordinance was not a physical taking. 68
The Supreme Court held that the ordinance was not a physical
taking under Loretto, since it did not compel the Yees to submit to
a physical invasion. 69 However, the Court stated that many of

162. Id. at 1530; see supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing footnote 17 of Loretto).
The Loretto Court held that a government could not condition the landlord's ability to rent his
property on the surrendering of the right to compensation for physical occupation. Loretto v.
Manhattan Teleprompter CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 439 n.17 (1982).
163. See Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1531; Brief for Petitioner at 17,25, Yee v. City of Escondido, 112
S. Ct. 1522 (1992) (No.90-1947) (arguing that the Escondido ordinance effects a regulatory taking
under both Penn Centraland Nollan); supranotes 76-89 and accompanying text (discussing Nollan's
substantial nexus test); supra notes 50-74 and accompanying text (discussing Penn Central'smultifactor balancing test).
164. See Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1527.
165. See !; supra notes 133-137 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning of the
California Court of Appeal in the Fourth Appellate District for holding that there was no physical
taking); supra notes 123-130 and accompanying text (discussing the opinion of the Ninth Circuit in
Hall).
166. Yee v. City of Escondido, No. S018658, Cal. LEXIS 353, at *1 (Cal. Jan. 21, 1991).
167. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1527.
168. Id at 1534.
169. See id. at 1528 (noting that the Escondido ordinance, even when considered in conjunction
with the California Mobilehome Residency Law, does not compel a physical invasion of property).
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the Yees' arguments would be relevant in determining whether the
ordinance effected a regulatory taking.17°
1. The Physical Takings Claim
The Court rejected the Yees' argument that the physical takings
claim was within the scope of the Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp.'s physical taking doctrine.17 ' Under
Loretto, the Court held that, when a government authorizes a
permanent physical occupation of property, the courts will
automatically consider the government's actions to be a taking,
without regard to the magnitude of the interference or the
importance of the societal interests.1 2 The Yee Court explained
that the Yees did not have a claim for a physical taking, because
they lacked an essential element--compulsion.' 73 In order to state

a claim for a physical taking, the Yees must show that the
government required them to submit to a physical taking. 74 The
government did not require the Yees to submit to a physical taking,
because they voluntarily decided to rent the mobile home
spaces. 75 Additionally, the Yees were not forced to continue
renting, since it was within the Yees' power to evict tenants if they
wanted to change the use of the land.'76
Next, the Court ruled that it is irrelevant that the ordinance may
have deprived the Yees of the benefit of the property. 177 Since

170. See id. at 1529-30 (highlighting the arguments of the Yees which are relevant to the
regulatory takings argument).
171. I11 at 1528; see supranotes 32-42 and accompanying text (discussing the physical takings
doctrine developed in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.); see also Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 422 (1982). Justice O'Connor wrote the
majority opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Stevens, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas. Yee, 112 S. Ct at 1525.
172. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426; see supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text (discussing the
Supreme Court's holding in Loretto).
173. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1528.
174. Id
175. Id.
176. See id at 1528.
177. See id at 1531-32 (explaining that since the Yees' did not apply for rent increases, as
authorized by the ordinance, the Yees could only challenge the ordinance as unconstitutional on its
face).
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the Yees did not exhaust all administrative remedies which the
ordinance made available,'78 the Court could not determine
whether the ordinance, as applied, was unconstitutional.' 79 The
Court ruled that it could not determine the extent to which the
ordinance deprived the Yees of the benefit of their land unless the
Yees had taken all available measures that the ordinance provided
in order to preserve the benefits of their land. 8 ' Thus, the extent
to which the ordinance deprived the Yees of the benefits of their
land was irrelevant."'
The Court then explained that Loretto v. Teleprompter
82
Manhattan CATV Corp.1
expressly limited the physical takings
doctrine from reaching regulation of landlord-tenant
relationships.' 83 Loretto recognized that the government has a
broad power to regulate housing conditions and the landlord-tenant
relationship.' 84 However, the Court in Yee noted that an
examination of landlord-tenant regulations would still be
appropriate in determining whether there was a regulatory
taking.'85 Specifically, the Court explained that courts may still
consider whether such regulations of the landlord-tenant
relationship had "gone too far," and consequently, effected a
regulatory taking.' 6
The Court then dismissed the Yees' complaint that the
ordinance transfers wealth to the tenant, by allowing the tenant to

178.

See id at 1531-32; supra note 156 (providing that the Escondido rent control ordinance

allowed park owners to apply to the City Council in order to get an increase in the amount of rent
which they could charge).
179. See Yee, 112 S. CL at 1532.
180. See id. at 1529, 1532.
181. 1& at 1532.
182. 458 U.S. 419; see supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text (discussing Loretto).
183. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1529; see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (discussing landlord-tenant relationships).
184. See i& (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CAT Corp., 458 U.S. 419,440 (1982)
and FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 252 (1987)).
185. Id.
186. See i. (quoting Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922)); supra notes 4346 and accompanying text (discussing Pennsylvania Coal and its introduction of the principle that
a regulation could go "too far-).
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charge an inflated price for the sale of the tenant's mobile
home."8 7 The Court reasoned that such a wealth transfer is
commonplace in the zoning context.188 The Court stated that there
is only one distinction between the wealth transfer effected by
Escondido's regulation and wealth transfers effected by other
zoning ordinances."8 9 The sole difference is that the inflated sale
price of the mobile homes merely makes the wealth transfer more
visible. 90 Nevertheless, the regulation does not effect a physical
taking, since there is no evidence that the government required the
Yees to rent or continue renting the mobile home pads.'
The Court then addressed the Yees' argument that the rent
control ordinance only benefitted the first tenant, due to the inflated
prices paid by subsequent tenants for the mobile home.192 The
Yees argued that since the California Mobilehome Residency Law
requires the landowner to accept any new tenant who has the
ability to pay rent, the first tenant can sell the right to occupy to
the subsequent tenant at an inflated price. 9 ' The Court rejected
the application of this argument to the physical taking context,
because the benefit to the initial tenant did not change the fact that
the government did not require the Yees to submit to the physical
occupation of their land. 9 The Court noted that the benefit for
the first tenant would be relevant in finding a regulatory taking

187. See Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1529; supra notes 158-163 and accompanying text (discussing the
Yees' arguments).
188. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1529. For example, the Court explained, when a property owner is
prohibited from mining coal on his land, the value of his property may decline but the value of his
neighbor's property may rise. I,
189. See id (citing Richard Epstein, Rent Controland the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54
BROOK. L. Rav. 741, 743 (1988)); Epstein, supra note 91, at 743 (opining that all rent control is
unconstitutional).
190. Yee, 112 S. Ct. 1529 (citing Richard Epstein, Rent Controland the Theory of Efficient

Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 741, 758-59 (1988)).
191. See Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1529 (stating that the existence of the transfer itself does not convert
regulation
192.
193.
194.

into a physical invasion).
See i. at 1530.
Ia at 1529-30.
Mdat 1530.
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under Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.19 Under Nollan,
a court will consider a regulation of property a taking if that
regulation does not substantially advance the aims of the
regulation. 9 6 The Court noted that a rent control ordinance which
only benefitted the initial tenant may indicate that the aims of the
ordinance are not being substantially advanced, 9 7 and thus,
would constitute a regulatory taking. 93
Next, the Court stated that the fact that the ordinance might

deprive the park owners of the opportunity to choose tenants was
irrelevant to the physical takings claim, because the ordinance did
not compel the Yees to open the property to occupation by
others.19 9 The Court again noted that this fact might be relevant
to establishing a regulatory taking claim."' Specifically, the
Court noted that depriving the park owners of the opportunity to
choose the tenants would be relevant to the Penn Central multifactor balancing test.2"' Courts use the Penn Central test to
determine whether a regulation goes so far as to unfairly single out
a property owner to bear a burden which society should bear as a
whole.2"
Finally, the Court rejected the Yees' contention that, under
Loretto, the government could not justify a physical invasion on the
grounds that a landlord has the option to stop renting the mobile

195. See id.; Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (finding a
regulatory taking because the city's restrictions did not substantially advance the purposes of the
restrictions); supra notes 76-89 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning of Nollan).
196. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834.
197. See Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1530 (noting that the benefit to the initial tenant would be relevant
to show the absence of a substantial nexus between the effect of the ordinance and the objectives it
is supposed to advance).
198. See id.
199. See id (stating that the inability to choose incoming tenants does not convert regulation
into the unwanted physical occupation of land).
200. Id
201. See id (noting that this argument could be considered to determine whether the ordinance

was disproportionately concentrated on a few persons); supra notes 55-73 and accompanying text
(discussing the factors presented in Penn Central).
202. See Yee, 112 S. Ct. 1530; supra notes 50-74 and accompanying text (discussing the multi-

factor balancing test recognized in Penn Central).
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home pads." 3 The Court ruled that this argument was based on
a misreading of Loretto."° The Escondido Ordinance had not
initially compelled the Yees to rent their property. 5 Since there
was no initial requirement to rent, the Yees could not argue, as the
Court in Loretto had argued, that the ordinance forced the Yees to
forfeit the right to compensation.2 ' Thus, the Court rejected all
five of the plaintiffs' arguments regarding physical takings.0 7
Although the Court repeatedly indicated that these arguments were
applicable to a regulatory takings analysis, the Court refused to
address the regulatory taking claim.2"'
2. The Court's Refusal To Address the Regulatory Takings
Claim
The Supreme Court in Yee repeatedly indicated that the Yees'
arguments would be relevant to a regulatory takings analysis.
However, the Court refused to rule on the regulatory takings issue
for several procedural and policy reasons. 2' Although the Yees
submitted a brief of the regulatory takings arguments to the
Supreme Court, the Court ruled that it would not review the
regulatory taking claim, since it was not listed in the petition for
certiorari.2"0 Therefore, the holding of Yee remains narrow. The

203. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1530; see supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing footnote
17 of Loretto).
204. See Yee, 112 S. Ct. 1530-31.
205. d. at 1531.
206. Id. at 1530-31.
207. See id. 1528-31.
208. Id. at 1532.
209. Id. at 1532-34.
210. See id. at 1532-33. The Court noted that the Supreme Court was bound not to review
questions which were not listed in the petition for certiorari. Id. A presumption against review exists

and is based on the policy of conserving the Courts resources and insuring that the respondent is
fully prepared to contest the petition for certiorari. I4 at 1533; see id (stating that notice to the
respondent enables the respondent to sharpen the arguments as to why certiorari should not be
granted); id (providing that the Court must limit itself to resolving only particularly important

questions). The Court stated that the presumption against reviewing questions not listed in the petition
was not overcome by the Yees. Id. at 1534. Justice O'Connor also explained that, since the Yees had

not exhausted all their administrative remedies, the claim that the ordinance as applied effected a
regulatory taking was not ripe. Id. at 1531.
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Escondido ordinance did not effect a physical taking because it did
not require the property owners to submit to a physical taldng. 1
C. Concurring Opinions by Justices Blackmun and Souter
Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opinion, agreed with the
majority's holding that the Yees did not state a claim for a physical
taking.212 However, Justice Blackmun did not decide whether the
Yees' arguments were relevant to a regulatory takings claim.21 3
Justice Blackmun stated that the regulatory takings claims were not
properly before the Court, and therefore, the Court should not have
considered the relevance of regulatory takings law at all.214
Justice Souter also agreed with the majority's holding that the
" 5 However,
Yees did not state a claim for a physical taking.21
without explanation, Justice Souter stated that he did not concur
with the Court's references to the relevance and significance of the
Yees' allegations to the regulatory taking analysis.216
Im. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Yee v. City of
Escondido217 settled a dispute between the Fourth District Court
of Appeal of California and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals of

211. See id at 1530.
212. Id. at 1534 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
213. See kL 1534-35 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
214. Id. Although Justice Blackmun expressed no opinion as to whether he thought the Yees'
arguments were relevant to a regulatory takings claim, he may have abstained from joining the
majority's opinion because of its reference to the significance of Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n. Justice Blaclamun dissented in Nollan, because he disagreed with the Court's "rigid
interpretation" of the necessary correlation between the burden created by a land development and
the regulation imposed to mitigate that burden. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825, 865 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated that such a close nexus would prevent
the creative solutions needed to correct the land-use problems of this country. See id. This
disagreement with the decision in Nollan was probably the cause of Justice Blackmun's reluctance
to join in the majority's suggestion that the Yees" arguments might have relevance to the Nollan
analysis.
215. Id. at 1535 (Souter, J., concurring).
216. Id.
217. 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992).
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the United States by holding that a rent control ordinance could not
effect a physical taking unless the ordinance requiredthe owner to
rent or continue renting the owner's property.218 The test for
finding a physical taking remains extremely narrow:219 A court
will only find a physical taking of property where the government
requires the owner to submit to the physical occupation of
land.22° Since Escondido's rent control ordinance did not compel
the Yees to rent or continue to rent their property, the ordinance
did not effect a physical taking. t Nonetheless, California mobile
home park owners should, on the same facts as Yee, be able to
prove a regulatory taking without just compensation. The Supreme
Court indicated that when determining whether the government has
effected a regulatory taking, courts should analyze the rent control
ordinance under the Penn Central TransportationCompany v. New
York City multi-factor balancing test or the Nollan v. California
CoastalCommission substantial nexus test. Under the Penn Central
multi-factor balancing test, the courts will weigh and balance five
factors to determine whether a regulation unfairly singles out the
owner to bear a burden which society should bear.222 Under the
Nollan substantial nexus test, the courts will engage in a dual
inquiry to determine whether a regulation substantially advances a
legitimate state objective.223 The Yee Court indicated that most
of the arguments the Yees advanced are relevant to the Penn
Centralmulti-factor balancing test or the Nollan substantial nexus
test.22 4 Since the outcome of a regulatory takings analysis

218. Id. at 1528,1534; see supra notes 168-208 and accompanying text (discussing the holding
of Yee).
219. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982) (discussing
the limited reach of the Court's physical takings analysis).
220. Yee, 112 S. Ct. 1528, 1534.
221. Id.; see supra notes 168-208 and accompanying text (discussing the holding of Yee).
222. See supra notes 50-74 and accompanying text (analyzing the Penn Centralmulti-factor
balancing test).
223. See supra notes 76-89 and accompanying text (discussing Nollan).
224. See supra notes 185-202 and accompanying text (highlighting the dicta in Yee which
applies to the mobile home park context).
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depends on the specific facts of each particular case, 225 the
outcome of Yee under Nollan and Penn Central may not be the
same for the rent control ordinances of other cities. An analysis of
the facts of Yee under Nollan and Penn Central, however, will
demonstrate to future litigants how the courts may view factors
which are common among most rent control ordinances regulating
mobile home parks.
Under an application of the Penn Central and Nollan tests to
Escondido's rent control ordinance, there are two possible
outcomes. First, using the Penn Centralmulti-factor balancing test,
226
the Yees would not be able to prove a regulatory taking.
Second, the Yees would likely be successful in proving that the
ordinance does effect a regulatory taking under Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission.227 The following analyses will demonstrate
the possible ramifications of the dicta in Yee on regulatory takings
law in the California mobile home park context.
A. Application of the Multi-Factor Balancing Test--A Weak
Argumentfor Park Owners
The application of the Penn Central multi-factor balancing test
determines whether a rent control ordinance unfairly singles out the
property owners to bear a burden which society should bear.228
The courts will examine the following five factors to make the
determination: (1) The economic impact which the regulation has
on the owner; (2) the extent to which the regulation interferes with
the owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations; (3) the

225. See Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (providing that the point at
which the government "goes too far" depends upon the particular facts of the case); United States
v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958) (stating that the constitutionality of the
restriction depends on the particular circumstances in that case); Penn Cent. Transp, Co. v. Now York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1977); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211,224 (1985)

(explaining that a court must make an essentially ad hoc factual inquiry to determine whether the
government has effected a regulatory taking).
226. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (discussing the underlying policy of the
Penn Central test).
227. See supra notes 76-89 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements of Nollan).
228. See Penn Central,438 U.S. at 123.
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character and nature of the taking; (4) the extent which the
regulation benefits the owner; and (5) the degree to which the
regulation advances societal interests.22 9
1. Economic Impact of the Regulation on the Owner of the
Property
To determine the economic impact of the regulation upon the
owner, the courts will consider the amount of money the landowner
loses as a result of the regulation.2 ' The courts will also consider
any mitigating provisions in the regulation.231
The Escondido rent control ordinance's economic impact on the
landowner is readily calculable. As a result of the Escondido

ordinance, the Yees must continue charging the same rental rates
they charged in 1988, despite any increase in the fair market rental
value of the property. The financial loss which the regulation
causes to the Yees is the difference between the fair market rental
value and the rate set by the Escondido rent control ordinance.
The courts would next look at any mitigating provisions in the
Escondido rent control ordinance. Under Pennell v. City of San
Jose232 and several other California state court cases, 233 a
regulation will be upheld if it affords the owner a fair or reasonable
rate of return.234 The Escondido rent control ordinance contains
a provision directing that the city afford a "fair and reasonable
return" to the park owner. 5 Therefore, it would seem that the
economic impact factor of the Penn Central test would not favor

229. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-25; see supra notes 50-74 and accompanying text
(analyzing the Penn Central multi-factor balancing test).
230. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing the economic impact factor and the
diminution in value test).
231. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text (discussing the first factor of the multifactor balancing test).
232. 485 U.S. 1 (1988); see supranotes 101-107 and accompanying text (discussing Pennell).
233. See supra note 107 (providing the California state court cases which have upheld rent
control ordinances which provide a fair or reasonable rate of return).
234. Pennell, 485 U.S. at 13.
235. Brief for Respondent at 27, Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992) (No. 901947); see infra note 267 (setting out the exact wording of the ordinance's purpose).
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the finding of a regulatory taking, because Escondido has expressly
complied with the Pennell requirement.
The Pennell Court explicitly stated that it did not determine
whether a court could find as unconstitutional a rent control
ordinance as applied to a specific landowner.236 Thus, the Yees
could argue that the Escondido ordinance, while providing for a
"fair and reasonable rate of return," did not in fact supply them
with a reasonable rate of return. The Yees could demonstrate the
absence of a fair and reasonable return by proving that there is an
inordinately large disparity between controlled rent rates and the
fair market value.237 However, Pennell will still make it difficult
for the Yees to show that the economic impact of the Escondido
rent control ordinance is any different from any other rent control
ordinance. Although the Pennell Court explicitly limited its holding
to a due process analysis, it stands for the proposition that rent
control, as a general matter, is constitutional.238 The courts'
general acceptance of rent control in Pennell would significantly
weaken the Yees' claim that the Yees are subject to a substantial
economic impact. In order to distinguish the Escondido ordinance
from rent control ordinances in general, the Yees must show that
the Escondido ordinance exacts an unusually large amount of
money. No one factor is determinative in the Penn Central multifactor balancing test. Thus, the courts will also consider the extent
to which the Escondido ordinance interferes with the Yees'
reasonable investment-backed expectations.

236. Pennell, 485 U.S. at 9-10.
237. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. City of Oceanside, 232 Cal. App. 3d 267,271,283 Cal. Rptr. 191,
193 (1991) (claiming that an Oceanside ordinance as applied, did not yield a fair and reasonable
return). The Kirkpatricks claimed that they receive only $272.55 per space a year, a mere 2% return
on an investment of $3,500,000. Idc at 271, 283 Cal. Rptr. 191, 193 (1991).
238. See Epstein, supra note 91, at 753 (stating that Pennell was a reiteration of the Court's
view that rent control, as a general matter, is constitutional); supra notes 101-107 and accompanying
text (discussing the significance of Pennel).
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2. Interference With Reasonable Investment Backed
Expectations
To find the extent of interference with the owners reasonable
investment-backed expectations, courts will attempt to determine
whether the owner should reasonably have known, before buying
the property, that the government was or would soon be regulating
the property."9 The courts will analyze the pervasiveness of the
regulations in a particular field.2" The courts will also consider
specific facts which tend to prove that the owner did have notice
241
that the government might soon regulate the property.
In 1988, studies indicated that 25% of all apartments in
California had controlled rent.242 Since 1978, the California
Mobilehome Residency Law has heavily regulated mobile home
parks in California. 243 The Yees purchased their property July 30,
1978.2 4 Since the Yees invested money at a time when state and
local governments heavily regulated mobile home parks in
California, the Yees should have known that Escondido might
subject mobile home parks to rent control regulation. Therefore, the
courts must conclude that the government, by passing a rent control
ordinance, did not interfere with the Yees' reasonable
expectations. 245 After considering the investment-backed
expectations of the owner, the Court would next consider the
character and nature of the taking.

239.

See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text (discussing the analysis for finding

reasonable investment-backed expectations).
240. See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211,227 (1985); supra notes 5962 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of analyzing the pervasiveness of regulations

when evaluating reasonable expectations).
241. See Connolly, 475 U.S. at 227; supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text (discussing the
reasonable investment-backed expectations factor).
242. BAAR, supra note 11, § 9.5, at 758.
243.

Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 109, at 420.

244. Brief for the Respondent at 1, Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992) (No. 901947).
245. See Radford, supra note 61, at 1069 n.293 (stating that a showing that rent control was
seriously and publicly being considered at the time of the investment would weigh in favor of the
ordinance).
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3. Characterand Nature of the Taking
In Penn Central,the Supreme Court explained that courts must
look at the character and nature of the regulation.246 As an
example, the Penn Central Court pointed to the difference between
physical occupations and regulations.247 However, subsequent
Supreme Court cases have expanded the character analysis to
include the inquiry of whether a regulation abrogates or restricts
essential property rights.24 The Takings Clause protects the
essential rights which all property owners possess--the rights to use,
possess, and dispose of the property.249 Here, mobile home park
owners could argue that Escondido has effectively taken their right
to dispose of property. As explained by the Ninth Circuit in Hall
v. City of Escondido,"S° the reason the initial tenant can sell the
mobile home at such a high rate, is that the tenant is effectively
transferring a right to occupy the property at a controlled rate. 1
Since the regulation allows the initial tenant to dispose of this right
at will, the Yees could argue that the regulation is depriving them
of the right to dispose of a part of the property. The courts would
consider such a deprivation to be serious in character and,
consequently, good evidence for finding a regulatory taking. In
addition to considering the character of the regulations, the courts
will consider the reciprocity of advantage accorded to the property
owner.
4. Reciprocity of Advantage
Another factor the courts will likely consider is the extent to
which the regulation affords the land owner an average reciprocity

246.

Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1977).

247. See supranotes 63-67 and accompanying text (analyzing the character and nature factor).
248. See supranotes 63-67 and accompanying text (analyzing the character and nature factor).
249. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text (discussing the rights of property owners).
250. 833 F.2d 1270 (9thCir. 1987), cert.denied, S85 U.S. 940 (1988);seesupranotes123.130
and accompanying text (discussing Hall).
251. See supranotes 123-127 and accompanying text (discussing Hall'sfinding that a property
interest is transferred by a Santa Barbara ordinance).
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of advantage.s 2 When analyzing reciprocity of advantage, courts
will look to the benefit that the regulation affords the
landowner. 3 In the rent control context, the reciprocity of
advantage is not as concretely definable as the other Penn Central
factors, because the benefits that an owner receives due to the
limitation on the owner's income are not readily apparent. For
example, in the zoning context, cities can argue that an owner
benefits from the promulgation of an orderly development
plan7. 54 On the other hand, a rent control ordinance's benefits to
the property owner are more abstract and, thus, more difficult to
prove.
Escondido would likely argue that all citizens benefit from rent
control since it prevents the problems which would result from
excessive rents.25 For example, Escondido could argue that the
provision of low-to-moderate-income housing benefits the owner,
because it removes many otherwise homeless people from the
neighborhood streets. As a result, the price of real estate, and
consequently, the fair market rental value of the land, would
increase. Without empirical data, it would be difficult to show that
homeless people are actually removed and that, as a result, real
estate prices increase.
The Yees could counter that the initial tenant is the only person
who will benefit from the rent control ordinance. Since the initial
tenant collects the inflated purchase price from the unlucky
subsequent tenant, the subsequent tenant must be financially
capable of affording the inflated sale price of the mobile home. A
court would find that a tenant with the means to pay such an
inflated price for rent would not have been homeless without the
enaction of the rent control ordinance. This fact would tend to
disprove any claim that the rent control ordinance would cause a

252. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text (discussing average reciprocity of
advantage).
253. See id
254. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 133-35 (1977).
255. See Coletta, supra note 68, at 345 (providing that all those burdened by rent regulations
are parties to a "social contract" which prevents the turmoil that might result from excessive and
unreasonable rents).
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decrease in homelessness and a subsequent increase in real estate
prices. Although the city would fail in proving an average
reciprocity of advantage, the city may still rely heavily on the final
factor in order to justify the rent control ordinance. The final factor
is societal interests which the ordinance advances.
5. Nature and Importance of Societal Interests
The court will then analyze the nature and importance of the
societal interests which the regulation serves7 6 The Escondido
rent control ordinance purports to eliminate the inequities resulting
from the scarcity of mobile home pads. 7 The city could rely
heavily on Pennell v. City of San Jose." Pennell upheld the
general validity of rent control as a protection for the general
welfare of persons with limited income.7 The Escondido
ordinance also protects the general welfare of society, particularly
tenants with limited income.
A distinct factor in the mobile home context, as opposed to rent
control in general, is the fact that mobile home park tenants tend
to be much older than the average tenant. 260 The city may argue
that there is an even greater interest involved in the mobile home
park context, due to this saturation of the market by elderly people.
Not only does the rent control ordinance provide assistance to the
poor, the Escondido ordinance protects a class of society that
people often neglect.
6. Determining the Outcome of the Balance
After applying the five Penn Centralfactors to the facts of Yee,
courts would probably uphold an ordinance similar to Escondido's

256. See Penn Central,438 U.S. at 124.
257. Brief for Respondent at 27, Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992) (No. 901947); see infra note 267 (setting forth Escondido's purpose of enacting the rent control ordinance).
258. 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
259. Pennell, 485 U.S. at 13; see supra notes 101-107 and accompanying text (discussing
Pennell).
260. Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 109, at 414.
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for two reasons. First, Pennell dictates that rent control, with its
important societal purposes, is generally valid.25 1 Second, the
Yees were aware of the pervasive regulation of the mobile home
market. When the Yees invested the money, they should have been
aware that future regulation of their rents was possible. Thus, the
court would likely conclude that the regulation did not effect a
taking under Penn Central. However, Yees could still argue that
the Escondido rent control ordinance does not meet the substantial
nexus test set out in Nollan.
B. Nollan--The SubstantialNexus Test
Under Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,2 62 courts
engage in a dual inquiry to determine whether a regulation has
effected a regulatory taking.263 First, whether there is a legitimate
state interest in enacting the regulation.'" Second, whether the
regulation substantially serves the same governmental interest
which the government purported to accomplish by enacting the
regulation.21 5 An examination of the facts of Yee under this
heightened standard of review will show that courts would rule that
Escondido's ordinance effects a regulatory taking. This analysis
will demonstrate to future litigants how the courts may view factors
which are common among rent control ordinances which regulate
mobile homes in California.
1. The City of Escondido Advances A Legitimate Purpose
For Enacting the Rent Control Ordinance
In order to uphold a regulation of property as constitutional
under Nollan, the courts must first find that there is a legitimate

261.

See Epstein, supra note 91, at 753 (stating that Pennell was a reiteration of the Court's

view that rent control, as a general matter, is constitutional); supranotes 101-107 and accompanying
text (discussing the significance of PennelO.
262.
263.

483 U.S. 825 (1987).
See supra notes 76-89 and accompanying text (discussing Nollan).

264.
265.

Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987).
Id
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interest in enacting the regulation. 2 In the Brief for the
Respondent to the Supreme Court, the City of Escondido argued
that the purpose of the ordinance was to remedy the inequitable
market situation caused by a scarcity of pads for mobile
homes.267 Other California cities are likely to advance similar
purposes when defending city ordinances against regulatory takings
8
claims.

26

Nollan recognized that the Supreme Court had not elaborated
on the standards for determining what constitutes a legitimate state
purpose.269 Nonetheless, courts will likely find that protecting
tenants from the inequities of a scarce rental market are legitimate
for two reasons. First, in recognizing the general validity of rent
control, Pennell stated that the Court had long recognized that the
protection of consumer welfare is a legitimate and rational goal of
price or rate control regulation.27 Courts would likely consider
Escondido's goal of protecting tenants from the inequities of a
scarce rental market, namely high rents, a legitimate and rational
goal. 271 Second, courts frequently uphold rent control ordinances

266. Id. at 834; see supra notes 76-89 and accompanying text (discussing the Nollan test).
267. Brief for Respondent at 27, Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992) (No. 901947). Escondido argued: "The Escondido Ordinance seeks to remedy an inequitable market situation
caused by the scarcity of mobile home spaces by protecting mobile home owners from unreasonable
space rental increases therefore protecting the homeowner's investments, while also providing park
owners with a just and reasonable return on the park owner's investment." Id. The Escondido
ordinance itself provides no express purpose. Brief for Petitioner at 26, Yee v. City of Escondido,
112 S.CL 1522 (1922) (No. 90-1947).
268. See Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 109, at 461. State and local governments often advance
the purpose of protecting tenants from the inequities which housing shortages create. Id. Basically,
governments advance three purposes to justify rent control: (1)The mitigation of adverse effects of
acute housing shortages; (2) the prevention of large and frequent rent increases which tenants cannot
afford; and (3) the reduction of excessive profits to landlords. Id.
269. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987).
270. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 13 (1988); see, e.g., Bowles v. Willingham, 321
U.S. 503, 513 n.19 (1944) (providing that a purpose of rent control is to protect tenants with limited
income); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591,610-12 (1944) (providing that the primary aim
of the Natural Gas Act was to protect consumers against exploitation by natural gas companies).
271. See, e.g., Birkenfield v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 160, 550 P.2d 1001, 1023, 130
Cal. Rptr. 465, 487 (1976); Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1969) (finding that
mitigating a housing shortage is a legitimate interest).
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to protect tenants in emergency situations.272 Courts may
analogize a rent control ordinance, which protects tenants from
shortages in the market, to the emergency measures which courts
have accepted as legitimate. 2' Having found that Escondido's
ordinance has a legitimate purpose, the courts will then determine
whether the ordinance substantially advances that purpose.
2. The Regulation Does Not Substantially Advance Its
Stated Purpose?
In order to pass the second prong of the Nollan test, the rent
control regulation must substantially advance the city's stated goal
of remedying an inequitable market situation.274 The facts of Yee
clearly indicate that the regulation does not substantially advance
the rent control's purposes.2 7 As noted in Yee, the rent control
ordinance only protects the first tenant of the park pad.276 The
initial tenant may sell the right to occupy the pad for a low rent by
charging an inflated sale price for his mobile home.27 7 The rent
control ordinance only remedies the inequities in the housing

market for the period in which the initial tenant rents the pad.278
Once the tenant decides to sell the mobile home, the tenant can
charge an inflated price for the ownership of the home. The
inflated price reflects the value of the right to live in a rent
controlled space. Therefore, the rent control ordinance does not

272.

See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text (discussing the decisions which upheld

rent control as an emergency measure). State legislatures are mindful that rent control measures have
survived the takings challenge only if they are "emergency" measures. Radford, supra note 61, at
1033. One commentator states that the most commonly cited "emergency" is a perceived shortage
of rental housing. MONICA R. LETr, RENT CONTROL: CONCEPTS, REALnTEs AND MECHANISMS 1-22
(1976).
273. See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
requirement of an emergency justification in its first analyses of the constitutionality of rent control).
274. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); see supra note 266
(setting forth the Escondido ordinance's purpose).
275. See supra notes 187-198 and accompanying text (discussing the argument that the initial
tenants of the pads reap the entire benefit of the rent control ordinance).
276. Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1529 (1992); see supra notes 192-198 and
accompanying text (discussing the Yee Court's analysis of initial tenant's windfall).
277. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1529.

278.

Id
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eradicate the inequity between the landowner and the initial tenant,
but merely shifts that unfairness to the subsequent tenant. The
subsequent tenants must suffer the consequences of a rental
shortage by paying the high rent, in the form of an inflated mobile
home sale price, which the ordinance was enacted to control.
Escondido could still argue that the ordinance corrects the
inequities of the market as to all tenants despite the initial windfall
to the first tenant. The city's claim would be that subsequent
tenants may still reap the benefits of the ordinance. Although the
subsequent tenants pay an inflated price for their mobile homes,
those tenants may charge an inflated price when they choose to
change residences. Arguably, when the subsequent tenant collects
this money, the regulation could be said to substantially advance
the ordinance's purposes. However, this argument will likely fail.
The courts must also recognize that the subsequent tenants may not
want to, nor be able to, sell. Requiring a tenant to sell a residence
in order to reap the benefit of an ordinance designed to protect
tenants is grossly unfair.
The courts must also recognize that the inequity of forcing the
tenants to sell in order to receive the benefits of the ordinance is
even greater when the courts consider the age group of the renters.
Studies reveal that in California, the average age of a mobile home
owner is about sixty-seven years old. 9 A court should find that
the fact that the tenants are in a substantially older age group
makes it less likely that the owners would want to, or be able to,
sell the mobile homes. After rejecting the argument that a
subsequent tenant could later reap the benefit of the ordinance by
selling the mobile home, the court would conclude that it would be
unlikely that anyone but the initial tenant would benefit from the
2 80
rent control ordinance.
The courts should also find that instead of substantially
advancing the ordinance's purposes, the regulation exacerbates the
problem of mobile home pad scarcity by causing a further decrease

279.

Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 109, at 414.

280. Id at 414; cf. d (providing that studies also indicate that there are an increasing number
of young adults who are renting mobile homes).
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in the availability of pads.231 One study reports that, since the
initial promulgation of rent controls in California, the construction
of new parks has severely decreased.282 Mobile home park
owners should argue that the primary cause of the decrease in
construction is the severity of the rent controls and its
accompanying regulations. 3
One commentator suggests that courts may also consider the
existence of lesser intrusive alternatives when ruling on the
legitimacy of challenged regulations.284 There are several
alternatives to rent control'which might work in the mobile home
context. First, Escondido could require the regulation of mobile
home prices. Regulating the prices of mobile homes would ensure
that the regulation carries out its purpose of protecting mobile
home owners from the inequities of the market. The initial tenant
would no longer be able to raise the price of the mobile home to
collect money for the right to occupy the rent-controlled space.
Second, the city could provide direct income subsidies, such as
need-based housing allowances. 215 Instead of controlling the rents
in a particular neighborhood or park, the city could distribute cash
or cash vouchers based on the financial need of the tenant. Since
the tenants would receive the subsidies directly from the city, local
government could closely regulate the distribution of benefits. Such
a regulatory system would prevent the tenant from reaping the
entire benefit of the rent control ordinance on the sale of the
mobile home.

281. See id. at 463 (opining that the rent control of mobile home parks has caused a further
decrease in the availability of mobile homes).
282. Id.
283. See id. (blaming the dearth in mobile home pads on severe rent regulation); see also
Radford, supra note 61, at 1036 (providing that rent control typically creates incentives for owners
of rental housing to convert their properties to higher values uses); Frey et al., Consensus and
Dissension Among Economists: An Empirical Inquiry, 74 AM. ECON. REv. 986, 986 (1984)
(providing that 98 % of American Economists surveyed agree that a ceiling on rent reduces the quality
and quantity of housing available).
284. Radford, supra note 61, at 1048.
285. Id See generally Leonard Burman, The Cost-effectiveness ofthe Low Income HousingTax
Credit Compared With Housing Vouchers: A CBO StaffMemorandum, 56 TAX NOTES 493, 493-99
(July 1992) (comparing the benefits of low-income housing tax credits which provide incentives for
investment in low-income housing with housing vouchers given to tenants to subsidize rents).
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Overall, the Yees would have a strong argument for a
regulatory taking under the Nollan analysis. It will be difficult for
courts to ignore that the rent control ordinance, which purports to
benefit all tenants of mobile home parks, makes only one wealth
transfer to the initial tenant. Therefore, similarly situated mobile
home park owners may now successfully argue that local
government has effected a regulatory taking under Nollan.
CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Yee reiterated
the Court's view that its criteria for finding a physical taking will
remain narrow.286 In order to find a physical taking, a court must
find that a government has required the owner to submit to the
physical occupation of land.2" ' Although the holding of Yee
explicitly dismissed the theory that a rent control ordinance could
effect a physical taking, the dicta of Yee provides an alternative
argument for similarly situated mobile home owners. The courts
must now decide whether a rent control ordinance such as the one
in Yee, effects a regulatory taking. Under Penn Central, mobile
home park owners would not likely be successful in proving a
regulatory taking since most mobile home park owners should have
reasonably expected that their investments might some day be
subject to rent control. Additionally, the courts' recognition that
rent control ordinances achieve important societal interests, will
substantially impede mobile home park owners from proving a
regulatory taking under Penn Central. On the other hand, it is
likely that a mobile home park owner can successfully argue that
a rent control regulation, similar to the one in Yee, effected a
regulatory taking under Nollan, because the regulation does not
substantially advance the purposes of the rent control ordinance.
Dwight C. Hirsh IV

286. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (discussing the limited application of the
physical takings theory).
287. Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1534 (1992).
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